Practice Ballots

The Cambodia Daily today reported that government officials and party activists are going door to door in some parts of the country asking people to mark practice ballots, reportedly instructing them to tick the CPP box. The article also put “practice ballots” in scare quotes and mentioned the potentially related issue of intimidation via their use.

If, as reported in the Daily, government officials operating under color of authority are conducting practice ballot marking sessions and instructing people to mark a particular party, this is a clear violation of election law and complaints should be filed with the NEC and/or CEC. If the complaints are not properly addressed it can be held up as yet another example of the partisan bias of a CPP-stacked NEC. If, on the other hand, government officials are claiming to be acting in a personal capacity when conducting practice ballot marking sessions, this may constitute a loophole in the law which may also be better addressed by a more balanced NEC.

Nevertheless, practice ballots have been employed by party activists in every election since 1998, (perhaps 1993 as well,) and not only by the CPP. In its legitimate use, it is done to help illiterate voters and inexperienced voters identify and correctly mark their preferred party on the ballot come election day. Mismarked ballot can cost parties votes to the degree that it can even have a significant effect on the voting results. (See example below.) And, of course, if the practice marking is conducted by party activists, the activists will instruct the voter as to how to mark the ballot for their particular party. As far as I can see there is nothing illegal about this. Insofar as the CPP may be effectively using this training more than other parties, it is not something for other parties to complain about but to copy.

Regarding the possible misuse of marked mock ballots, in all previous national elections in which party activists have conducted practice ballot marking, there have never been any significant reports from observers of those marked mock ballots being used for nefarious purposes in the real election. The mock ballots almost always distort or blur the parties other than that of the activists conducting the training, and otherwise do not appear to be authentic ballots. Further, ballot box stuffing and other fraudulent practices in which some might imagine the mock ballots being used has never played a significant (if any) role in Cambodian elections.

It was also mentioned in the Daily story that some people have complained that they feel intimated by activists/government officials asking them to mark practice ballots. If it is government officials acting under color of authority, then as mentioned above, voters are entitled to feel intimidated and should file a complaint. If, on the other hand, it is merely party activists, people should simply say ‘no’ if they do not want to participate. To suggest that Cambodian voters, after 20 years of elections, are incapable of refusing to participate in partisan activities is to take a demeaning paternal attitude regarding the capability of Cambodian adults. At some point, people must be expected to stand up for themselves.

One example of how mismarked ballots can impact the election results can be found in 2003 National Assembly election in Prey Veng province. Due to the large number of parties participating in the 2003 elections, a butterfly-style ballot was employed on which two columns of parties and tick boxes appeared side by side. The mismarking of these ballots by a significant percentage of voters seems to have earned SRP an extra seat at the expense of the CPP.

The Rice Party, an obscure party that did not even campaign in Prey Veng, received an inordinately large number of votes, most likely due to the butterfly design of the ballot placing the Rice Party tick box immediately to the left of the CPP logo, apparently leading some inexperienced voters to tick the wrong box. Like other minor parties in its league, the Rice Party probably should have received less than 2000 votes, but instead got 24,891 votes, an astounding 5% of the total vote in Prey Veng. FUNCINPEC was similarly affected, with the minor party opposite FUNCINPEC on the ballot also receiving an inordinate number of votes. Also, many of the spoiled ballots had a tick for both the Rice Party and the CPP. In all likelihood almost all of the votes for the Rice Party were intended for the CPP. The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) was unaffected by similar mismarking because, just by chance of ballot design for Prey Veng province, it appeared alone with no other party next to it. This loss of votes for the CPP to the Rice Party has had a direct effect on the seat allocation. The final seat allocation was CPP (6), FUNCINPEC (3), SRP (2). But if the CPP had received only 15,000 of the Rice Party’s votes (a conservative estimate) the seat allocation would be CPP (7), FUNCINPEC (3), SRP (1). The mistaken votes for the Rice Party denied the CPP a seat and gave it to the SRP. After the election CPP party officials told me that in the future they would conduct more rigorous ballot marking practice to make sure that there would be no similar reoccurrence.

Media access and The Cambodia Daily online in Khmer

I was recently exploring the back roads of Kampot province, rice paddies, more rice paddies and the occasional little hamlet, bumping down narrow dirt roads in my beat up old Camry. Great car for rural Cambodia, but she was suffering that day. The engine was getting ready to give up the ghost 20km out in the backcountry, overheating and burning off water. Trying to get back to the main road I had to stop every couple of kilometers to refill the radiator. Midday, temp gauge topping out again, I pulled off in a village at a thatch shack full of Khmer countryguys sipping tea and coffee and watching the community TV. A no-English situation. I asked for water for the car. One guy motioned to a cistern beside the shack and handed me a scooper. "Thank you very much." But the engine was too hot and needed a few minutes to cool. I pulled up a chair, ordered a black coffee and settled in.

The guys gave me a curious glance now and again, and finally one brave soul started asking me questions (in Khmer) - the usual - what's you name, how old are you, are you married, and finally, what are you doing here? I answered in Khmer, and they understood most of what I said, but when I tried explaining that I was out there writing a piece for a travel magazine, they just didn't seem to get it. Probably my fault. I was struggling with the word for 'magazine.' Frustration building and trying to simplify things, I switched to 'newspaper,' an easy and common word. "Ahhh, cassette, cassette, ko'ot traukah cassette" ('he works for a newspaper') one guy said, and everybody seemed satisfied and went back to watching TV.

Figuring the engine was now cool enough to take water, I fetched a scoop full from the cistern and went to remove the radiator cap, but it was too hot to touch. I rummaged in my car for a rag, found an old copy of the Phnom Penh Post and used it as hand protection to remove the radiator cap. Noticing what I was doing, one of the TV watchers announced "He works for the Phnom Penh Post!" This drew everybody's attention. I tried explaining that I don't work for the Post, but nobody was listening. To my surprise, one guy was exclaiming how great the Post was, talking excitedly, "Oooo, Borei Keila, Boeung Kak, I read it in the Phnom Penh Post. Post is very good, very good. Borei Keila not good, very bad. They steal! People's houses! Post very good!" and so on. Others grunted emphatic agreements.

I wasn't surprised that they thought that the Post was good, but that back here in the middle of rural nowheresville they knew it at all. And more, that they had learned about controversial land-grabbing issues from it. And even more, that they were greatly appreciative to have that information, presumably in contrast to the say-nothing local Cambodian press.

Most of the local Cambodian press, whether government controlled or cowered into self censorship, remains almost silent on controversial issues such as land-grabbing and the attendant protests. The English language press in Cambodia (The Cambodia Daily and The Phnom Penh Post) regularly reports on these controversial topics and is largely tolerated by the government, presumably because (even in its Khmer language version) it is thought to have very little penetration into the Khmer market, especially in the countryside where most of the population resides.

For at least the last decade and a half the government has shown sensitivity to foreign news about Cambodia (especially news with a critical/anti-government lean) reaching into the countryside. As early as the 1998 election period, back when rural folk got much or most of their news from radio, I heard regular reports of village chiefs patrolling at night, listening under the thin floored stilted houses for people tuned into VOA (broadcast in Khmer), and then threatening them to turn it off. More recently, in the last commune elections (2012), for the first time ever the government ordered VOA and RFA off-the-air on election day.

Sitting back in the rural countryside 20km from the nearest paved road, and seeing the impact The Phnom Penh Post was making back there, I wondered how long the tolerance of the English language press and its unrestrained reporting could last in Cambodia. On a related note, with Internet penetration expanding exponentially and Facebook users now likely exceeding a half-million in Cambodia, I have also wondered whether the ruling party's recent paranoid-seeming tactics in the run-up to the national elections may be due in part to their fear of losing grip on the media and the flow of information in Cambodia.

Which brings me to The Cambodia Daily. The Daily, in my opinion, like most of the English language press, leans anti-government, and has been hitting hard in the last couple of months as the election approaches, (not that there is anything wrong with that in a country that supposedly enjoys freedom of the press.) Last week, the Daily launched an online version of its publication in Khmer language, free of charge, including all of its election coverage and stories critical of the ruling party and government. This is a timely and, in my opinion, gutsy move on their part, especially during this very tense pre-election period and on Internet where the government feels its media control slipping. This is also a fine example for other in-country media that self-censors for fear of reprisal. Granted, it is easier for the Daily than the Cambodian press because it is run mostly by foreigners and has far less penetration in the Khmer market, but as demonstrated by the impact of the Post deep in the country, this latter part is changing.

It will be interesting to see what happens. If the online Khmer Cambodia Daily catches on, if it begins to penetrate deeply into the Khmer market, will it face temporary suspensions during sensitive times like VOA/RFA, or worse, threats and intimidation like the Khmer press? Or will it perhaps help lead the way to a freer press in Cambodia?

The Cambodia Daily - Khmer version

Khmer Pedophiles and the Cambodia Daily

Cambodia Daily, Sept 21, 2010, page 24

In the Cambodia Daily newspaper, foreigners who have been caught having sex with a minor child in Cambodia are routinely (and justifiably) referred to as 'pedophiles' or 'alleged pedophiles,' and the problem of 'foreign pedophiles' is almost always noted somewhere in such articles. There are also disturbingly regular reports in the Cambodia Daily of Cambodians "raping" children in Cambodia. In fact there currently seems to be an epidemic of Cambodians sexually abusing children. But, regardless of the age of the victims, Cambodians are never referred to as 'pedophiles' in the Cambodia Daily.

Helping to illustrate this point, today there are two stories in today's Daily set side-by-side (see above,) one of a foreign "pedophile" who sexually abused an 8-year-old boy and later two 16-year-old boys. Next to it there is a story of a Cambodian man who allegedly "raped" an 8-year-old girl and a 5-year-old girl on separate occasions. For some reason, the Cambodian who allegedly repeatedly sexually abused children is not referred to as a 'pedophile' or 'alleged pedophile' in the Daily article. And even though the article notes literally hundreds of cases of sexual abuse against children by Cambodians, there is no mention of pedophilia. Now, I could imagine several possible reasons for the different vocabulary used in these two specific articles in today's paper, that is if it weren't for the fact that in the dozens and dozens of stories of the sexual abuse of children by Cambodians and foreigners reported in the Cambodia Daily over the last decade, the Daily has never once referred to a Cambodian child sex offender as a 'pedophile' in any of its articles (at least in my semi-systematic observation.) Let me repeat for emphasis, not even once.

Assuming my observation is accurate, there would seem to be a pattern here. The Cambodia Daily seems categorically averse to attaching the label of 'pedophile' to Cambodian offenders, and I was just wondering why. What is the difference between Cambodian and foreign child sex offenders when it comes to being a 'pedophile?' Is there a racial component to being a 'pedophile'? Can a Cambodian be a pedophile or is that a category reserved exclusively for foreigners?

UPDATE: October 23, 2010
The Cambodia Daily provided a nice example this week. Two articles, same writer, 4 days apart, two men, one Khmer, the other a foreigner, arrested for virtually the same crime - purchasing sex from girls younger than 15. The article describes stereotypical pedophile behavior on the part of the Khmer man - engaging in serial sexual abuse of children, choosing his residence so as to have access to children, 'luring' them into his home where he would then pay them for sex.... Yet, in the article about the Khmer man, there is no mention of 'pedophilia.' Whereas in the article about the foreigner, (which in fact has less to do with the nature of the crime than in his accusation about the court,) pedophilia is not only mentioned but is in the headline. Very odd.

(Click on the article to enlarge it.)

Was the Thaksin gambit worth it?

Back in late 2009, tension between Thailand’s Red Shirt faction and the Thai government was building dramatically, as were tensions between Cambodia and Thailand over the disputed border area around Preah Vihear. The Thai Red Shirt/Yellow Shirt conflict was born of the 2006 military coup in Thailand in which Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was forced from office and the later legal dissolution of the subsequent pro-Thaksin government, leaving Thaksin’s supporters, i.e. the Red Shirts, disaffected and Thaksin a wanted fugitive. It also gave rise to the Yellow Shirts, i.e. the Royalist/anti-Thaksin faction, thus creating the political instability and conflict that continues in Thailand to this day. The current tension between Cambodia and Thailand at Preah Vihear is connected to this political instability in Thailand - a decades old territorial dispute between the two countries which is being exacerbated anew by Thai nationalists attempting to exploit it for internal political purposes. It was in the midst of these rising tensions in November 2009 that Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen chose to very publicly and ceremoniously appoint former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as an ‘Economic Advisor’ to the highest level of the Cambodian government.

When Thaksin was appointed an economic advisor, Prime Minister Hun Sen declared him an “eternal friend” and the Cambodian government claimed that it was a purely practical and internal matter designed to take advantage of Thaksin’s unique knowledge and experience to assist Cambodia navigate difficult economic times. After all, Thaksin is a multi-billionaire telecommunications mogul and former head of state of a Southeast Asian nation. A starry and relevant CV to be sure. But most observers saw more than mere practicality in this new embrace. His appointment seemed an obvious jab at the Thai government where he was a wanted fugitive and the central figure behind the anti-government Red Shirts. The Thai government was predictably infuriated, so much so that it severed diplomatic relations with Cambodia, greatly increasing tensions between the two countries. Many observers suggested that a slap at Thailand was the entire point of the Thaksin exercise – to thumb noses at Thailand, to show that even though Cambodia might not be able to match Thailand militarily at Preah Vihear, it still, at the very least, had the ability to get their goat. You could almost hear the snickering coming from Takhmau.

Since then much water has passed under the bridge, especially in Thailand. Back in late 2009 Economic Advisor Thaksin gave a couple of speeches in Cambodia, attended one or two rubber chicken luncheons and then buggered off to other parts of the world to attend to his own troubled situation. Meanwhile in Thailand the Red Shirt confrontation with the government was building to a nasty head. Protests formed in Bangkok and then dragged on for months. The city was all but paralyzed. It was rumored (though untrue) that Thaksin was in Cambodia waiting to return to Thailand in triumph when the Red Shirts broke the government. The protests in Bangkok then exploded into a violent and ugly climax – riots, bombings, arsons, dozens of deaths, a city in flames, with Thaksin’s Red Shirts far less than the innocents in it all. They ultimately caught the losing end and scattered back to the countryside from whence most of them came, not broken but certainly far worse for the wear. With Bangkok trashed and smoldering, the Red Shirts and by proxy Thaksin lost a lot of favor in the eyes of the region, the world and even many otherwise sympathetic Thais for the damage done.

Through it all Cambodia had surprisingly little to say about her formerly vaunted “eternal friend” and Economic Advisor. Tensions and rhetoric between the countries continued to rise over the border dispute at Preah Vihear but Thaksin became an unspoken sore point, all but unmentioned by Phnom Penh for months, until day before yesterday, when it was announced that Thaksin had resigned his position as Economic Advisor. The resignation was readily accepted (if not requested) by Cambodia and almost immediately thereafter (literally within hours) Cambodia and Thailand announced the resumption of normal diplomatic relations. The Thaksin episode had come to an unceremonious end.

Trying to make sense of the affair, yesterday’s Cambodia Daily (August 25, 2010) asked the question “Was the Thaksin Experiment Worth the Trouble?” This, in my opinion, is the wrong question, or at least a mischaracterization. The relationship with Thaksin was not an “experiment.” It was a gambit.

Most observers can agree that the appointment of Thaksin as an advisor to the government was not to be taken at face value. The Cambodian government did not appoint Thaksin and raise tensions with Thailand to the point of severing diplomatic relations simply because it wanted his wise words on attracting tourists and marketing rice. Many observers have suggested that the appointment was for the purpose of tweaking the Thais and scoring a few cheap political points in Cambodia. Political researcher Pavin Chachavalpongpun commented that from the start the appointment was “superficial, political and temporary” and that,

”…the decision of Hun Sen to appoint (Thaksin) served the purpose of irritating and attacking the Thai leadership…Hun Sen was not only successful in using Thaksin to tarnish his opponents in Thailand but also gained some political points amongst his Cambodian supporters…” (Cambodia Daily, August 25, 2010)

But this gives far too little credit to the strategic prowess of Prime Minister Hun Sen. While the Prime Minister is not above a bit of self-serving schoolyard antics, the predictable and very high price paid for the appointment of Thaksin belies a deeper purpose and a potentially greater payoff.

At the time of Thaksin’s appointment in Cambodia, Thailand was in a precarious and unstable political state. Thaksin’s Red Shirts represent a significant portion of the Thai population (perhaps even a majority,) which bears a valid political grievance. Their elected leader (Thaksin) had been removed from power by the most undemocratic means and they were arguably being deprived the proper democratic process to which they were entitled. Further, their complaints and cries for democracy were enjoying a certain degree of international support even outside the region. Back in late 2009/early 2010 the Red Shirts were trying to force new and unrestricted national elections in Thailand and at the time the outcome of that pressure was as yet unknown. If they had achieved this goal there was the very real possibility that a Thaksin sympathetic party or perhaps even Thaksin himself could have regained power.

On a different front, though it is beyond impolite to speak of such matters, and with all due respect, the King of Thailand is old and frail and likely not long for this world. When he passes, whether his son the heir apparent becomes king or there is political upheaval and some other faction achieves power, there is the significant possibility that those who gain control will be from a camp sympathetic to Thaksin.

It was these possible futures on which Hun Sen was betting when he appointed Thaksin an advisor and declared him an “eternal friend.” Thaksin regaining power may not have been the most likely possible future, but with Reds pushing hard for elections and the King in flagging health, it was still well within the realm of possibility and the potential payoff was significant. Far from forming some “superficial and temporary” relationship with Thaksin for short term political gain, Hun Sen was gambling on a possible future in which Thaksin would regain power and, by standing with Thaksin when he was down, Hun Sen was laying the groundwork for a deep and lasting relationship with a potential future key player if not leader of Thailand.

In retrospect, was the Thaksin gambit worth the trouble to Cambodia? Was the price paid in broken diplomatic relations and increased tensions worth the potential payoff of warm relations with a potential future key figure in the Thai leadership?

First it must be acknowledged that the gambit has probably been lost. The disastrous Bangkok riots have so soured the position of the Red Shirts and Thaksin that regardless of how the Red/Yellow conflict eventually plays out, it is unlikely that Thaksin will be able to return to Thailand in a position of power anytime in the foreseeable future. But a lost gambit is not necessarily one that should not have been made. Nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Though diplomatic relations with Thailand were temporarily broken, they have now been restored with smiles all around. And though the tensions at Preah Vihear have intensified, they may have anyway as this incarnation of the dispute is as much a toy of Thai internal politics as a product of Cambodian-Thai relations. Regardless, the intensification has not amounted to any actual significant military confrontation or loss of territory. In sum, for all of the ill words and poor relations of the last nine months, little or nothing material has been lost by Cambodia. On the other hand, even though not won, the potential payoff if Thaksin had regained power could have been monumental. And even though formal relations between Thaksin and Cambodia have ended, they appear to have done so on good terms. The positive feelings generated between Cambodia and the Thaksin camp still exist – a card in the hole should that camp achieve power at some later date.

All things considered, actual losses weighed against potential and real gains, the answer to the title question is ‘yes,’ whether there is ultimately a big payoff or not, the Thaksin gambit was worth it to Cambodia.

(I realize that my rendition of the Thai political situation is superficial. My purpose here was to analyze Cambodia’s relation to Thailand in regard to this specific episode, not to offer any great insights into Thai politics. My characterization of the Thai political situation, while comic book, is IMO sufficient to my point about Cambodia’s Thaksin gambit.)